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ABSTRACT 
 
Corruption in commercial enterprise often is enabled and enhanced by the use of legal 
structures like companies, trusts and partnerships, so as to conceal the “beneficial 
ownership” of assets. Features of corporate opacity help to generate, conceal and maintain 
the resources necessary for many corrupt relations and actions. While there have been 
various legislative responses to this phenomenon recently, questions remain about these 
laws’ likely effectiveness, as well as their implications for human rights.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter examines how corruption in commercial enterprise is enabled and enhanced by 
the deployment of ostensibly legal structures so as to conceal the “beneficial ownership” of 
assets. The opacity of different instruments can be exploited to generate, conceal and 
maintain the resources necessary for many corrupt relations and actions. This is prompting 
various legal amendments at the domestic and transnational level, in an effort to improve 
transparency and oversight and thus prevent and deter corrupt practices.   
 
The assets that are necessary for and derive from corruption are often held in or transmitted 
through legal business structures and mechanisms, in what are termed generically as 
“corporate vehicles”. These are “legal entities through which a wide variety of commercial 
activities are conducted and assets are held”, including corporations, trusts, and partnerships 
with limited liability characteristics (OECD, 2001, pp. 12-13; FATF, 2006, p. 3). They share 
features like separate legal personality, in constituting legal persons separate from members 
or shareholders, and they often have limited liability characteristics, in that partners or 
shareholders are liable only for their investment and their personal assets will not be 
reachable by the entity’s creditors. In most instances, corporate vehicles are used legally, but 
they can also be relied on to prevent the seizure or taxation of assets, to launder money, and 
to conceal the proceeds or payments from bribery, due to the very characteristics that make 
them valuable in legitimate contexts.   
 
The crux of the issue in relation to corporate vehicles is their capacity to hide the true or 
ultimate “beneficial owner” of property that pays for or is the profit from corruption. The 
term, familiar to those of us in the common law world as referring to the beneficiary of a 
trust, is now used more broadly than its original usage to denote the person who will benefit 
from or can use particular assets. Issues of definition and scope of “beneficial owner” arise; 
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there is a lack of clarity in and inconsistency between jurisdictions as to the term’s meaning 
(FATF, 2010, p. 28; United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2010, p. 17). An extensive 
literature explores the meaning of beneficial ownership (Becker et al., 2015; Collier, 2011). 
Rather than rehearsing or resolving these debates, I take a functionalist approach, centring 
on the control over assets and the benefit accrued. I endorse the view that beneficial 
ownership should not be interpreted in a narrow, formally legal sense (OECD, 2014), but 
rather should be understood “as a material, substantive concept—referring to the de facto 
control over a corporate vehicle” (van der Does de Willebois et al., 2011, p. 3).  
 
Indeed, this is the approach of the European Union Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
(4AMLD), which came into force across the EU on 26 June 2017. Article 3(6)) describes 
“beneficial owner” as “the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer 
and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted”. The 
term is also referred to expressly, though not defied, in a number of international conventions 
and standards. Article 14(1)(a) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption stipulates 
that each State Party shall “institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory 
regime … [with] requirements for customer and, where appropriate, beneficial owner 
identification”. In addition, the non-binding but highly influential Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) Recommendations,1 refer direct to transparency and beneficial ownership of legal 
persons and arrangements (FATF, 2012). Recommendation 24 refers to need for “adequate, 
accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons” in 
preventing their misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing. Recommendation 25 
requires such information on express trusts and provides that countries should consider 
“measures to facilitate access to beneficial ownership and control information by financial 
institutions”. As is elaborated upon below, these encapsulate the position that access to 
information is key in identifying and addressing the problem of concealing the beneficial 
ownership of assets in the organisation of corruption in commercial enterprise. 
 
In this chapter I map three different structures that can be used to hide beneficial ownership 
and thus to facilitate corrupt practices in otherwise legal commercial enterprise: companies, 
trusts and partnerships.2 I consider why and how they are employed, examining their key 
characteristics. I critique the legal responses to this apparent misuse in the UK in particular, 
with reference to its different constituent jurisdictions, as well as commenting on the legal 
stimuli emanating from the European Union and other international organisations. Though 
the focus is predominantly domestic, the chapter’s observations are widely relevant, as they 
speak to global policy and legal trends. Then I consider possible objections that might be 
raised to these legal changes, and seek to place them in a conceptual framework.  
 
This chapter’s analysis generates three major claims about the nature and scope of the 
responses to the concealment of beneficial ownership in the organisation of corruption in 
commercial enterprise. The first claim is that a strong and proportionate regime to identify 
beneficial ownership may be important to address corruption adequately, but will have 
questionable effect on the integrity of financial markets overall. The second claim is that 
                                                     
1 The FATF Recommendations were issued first in 1990, and then revised in 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2012. In 
addition, FATF monitors its members’ implementation and operation of AML measures, as well as vulnerabilities 
to money laundering.   
2 While other mechanisms (like hedge funds) are relevant, these are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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further empirical work is needed to determine where scholarly and operational priorities 
should lie, in terms of the legal structures, jurisdictions and criminal actors: our focus on 
certain mechanisms and structures could well be misplaced. Finally, I suggest that ultimately, 
law alone will not (perhaps never) address this phenomenon, not least given the unavoidable 
and apparently intractable tension between market freedom/flexibility and responses to 
corruption.  
 
 
THE CONTEXT  
 
Concerns about the misuse of different legal entities for corrupt purposes and their ability to 
conceal the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries of property have been on the policy and 
policing agenda for a number of decades (T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 2000, p. 11). The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development observed in 2001 that  
“Almost every economic crime involves the misuse of corporate entities – money 
launderers exploit cash-based businesses and other legal vehicles to disguise the 
source of their illicit gains, bribe-givers and recipients conduct their illicit transactions 
through bank accounts opened under the names of corporations and foundations, and 
individuals hide or shield their wealth from tax authorities and other creditors through 
trusts and partnerships, to name but a few examples” (OECD, 2001, p. 3). 
 
In the domestic UK operational sense, the National Crime Agency (NCA) (2016, paras. 90-93) 
stated last year that “high end money laundering” relies on corporate structures set up 
specifically with obscured beneficial ownership, in order to hide the nature and ownership of 
the funds. The NCA (2016, para. 111) further stressed that: “Bribe payers and recipients, 
intermediaries and professional enablers create and use corporate structures such as shell, 
subsidiary and subcontracting companies to channel bribe payments and the proceeds of 
corruption, as well as to obscure their criminal activity.”  
 
In the political setting, notions of transparency and misuse are to the fore, and momentum 
appears to be gathering in respect of the disclosure of beneficial ownership. The theme of the 
G8 Summit at Lough Erne in June 2013 was tax evasion and transparency of corporate 
ownership, and the “Beneficial Ownership Principles” were endorsed under David Cameron’s 
leadership (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). Then in 2014 the G20 leaders adopted High Level 
Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency in Brisbane, declaring “financial 
transparency, in particular the transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and 
arrangements a ‘high priority’” (G20, 2014). These concerns were given added impetus by the 
revelations in the Panama Papers in April 2016, followed closely by the political commitments 
made at the Anti-Corruption Summit in London, May 2016.  
 
This rhetoric and increased political attention exemplify the perception that legal structures 
are deployed by individuals involved in corrupt practices to create, conceal and contain 
illegally obtained assets. What remains less clear is what types of structures are used, to what 
extent, and why; and what difference, if any, the intensified policy focus and rapidly changing 
legal terrain make.  
 
 
  4 
CORRUPTION AND “CORPORATE VEHICLES”: RESPONDING THROUGH LAW  
 
Three different corporate vehicles will now be considered: companies, trusts and 
partnerships. Some of these structures are “on-shore”, that is, located in the current 
jurisdiction, whereas others are off-shore, in being incorporated or registered in another 
jurisdiction, usually one with preferable rates of tax or simpler systems of incorporation.  This 
cross-border dimension has implications for the responses to such abuse, and will be alluded 
to later in the chapter. 
 
Companies  
 
The use of commercial companies to facilitate and perpetuate criminality has long been 
recognised in both the academic and policy spheres (Schneider, 2004; Malm and Bichler, 
2013; Petrunov, 2011; Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007, p. 39). This can involve otherwise legal 
firms as a front for criminal purposes, such as the use of a pre-existing company with a 
legitimate business to launder or conceal assets. It could also involve the creation of shell 
companies with a sole criminal objective, with no significant assets or operations at the time 
of incorporation. Indeed, a UK Cabinet Office study back in 2000 suggested that almost all 
complex UK money laundering schemes involved UK shell companies (Performance and 
Innovation Unit, 2000, p. 85). Once a company is formed, “nominee directors” may be 
installed while the identity of the actual beneficial owner(s) of the company is hidden 
(Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000, p. 86). Shell companies benefit from the reputation 
of UK (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2000, p. 86), insofar as there may be a presumption 
or façade of legitimacy. There is of course a tension between market imperatives and the 
need to prevent potential criminality, in that the ease of incorporation is seen as one of the 
strengths of the UK’s competitive regulatory environment (Performance and Innovation Unit, 
2000, p. 86).  
 
There is some evidence that companies are used to hide and maintain the finances for 
corruption. The World Bank carried out research into 150 cases of large-scale corruption, 
finding that in the vast majority of them, a corporate vehicle was misused to hide the money 
trail, and the corporate vehicle in question was a company or corporation (van der Does de 
Willebois et al., 2011, p. 2). As yet, comparable data on the UK are missing.3  
  
In an effort to respond to perceived exploitation of company secrecy, some recent legislative 
changes were made in the UK which may impact on the financing of and for corruption. Two 
of these will now be examined. In the first instance, Part 7 of the Small Business, Enterprise 
and Employment Act 2015 imposes requirements on companies to update more detailed 
information annually at Companies House. This has been amended subsequently to adhere 
to the requirements of the European Union’s Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive.4 
Second, the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 limits who or indeed what 
can be a company director.  
 
                                                     
3 See the findings of our current project on “The (Mis)Use of Corporate Vehicles by Transnational Organised 
Crime Groups in the Concealment, Conversion and Control of Illicit Finance”. 
4 For further detail see Campbell, MLR 2017, forthcoming.  
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Under section 81 of the 2015 Act (as enacted originally), UK companies, limited liability 
partnerships and societates europaeae must maintain a register of “people with significant 
control” (PSC) and provide this to Companies House annually. This is a central, searchable and 
annually updated register, which can be used to determine who controls certain entities in 
the UK. “Significant control” (as defined in the rather complex Schedule 1A of the Companies 
Act 2006) includes holding directly or indirectly more than 25% of company’s shares or voting 
rights, or having the right to appoint or remove a majority of the directors. It also includes an 
individual who exercises significant influence or control over a trust or firm which does not 
have separate legal personality and has significant influence or control over the company. 
Non-compliance is criminal. Failure to provide accurate information on a PSC register or to 
comply with notices requiring PSCs to provide information is a criminal offence for both the 
company and its officers, punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment (Companies Act 2006, 
s.790F). The majority of companies and LLPs need to comply with the provisions or risk being 
convicted of a criminal offence (listed companies are broadly exempt as they are already 
subject to transparency obligations under the Financial Conduct Authority’s Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules5). There is no statutory defence available to a company for breach of the 
provisions.  
 
Article 30 of 4AMLD, to which the UK must adhere, requires EU member states to hold 
adequate, accurate and current information on the beneficial ownership of corporate and 
other legal entities incorporated within their territory in a central register, and provides that 
such information should be made available to specific authorities, organisations and those 
with a legitimate interest across the EU. Annual updating as provided for in the 2015 Act was 
not sufficient to meet 4AMLD’s requirement for information to be “current”, and so the 
Information about People with Significant Control (Amendment) Regulations 2017 introduced 
a requirement to notify changes in beneficial ownership within a shorter time frame. Entities 
must record changes to information on their PSC register within 14 days of obtaining the 
information and file that information within a further 14 days (Regulations 7 & 8). It is likely 
that in future EU Member States will need to put in place mechanisms to ensure the 
information in the register is also verified on a regular basis.6  
 
Furthermore, Article 30(9) of 4AMLD provides for an exemption from access to beneficial 
ownership information in exceptional circumstances, such as where access would expose the 
beneficial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, violence or intimidation, or where 
s/he is a minor or otherwise incapable. There is no equivalent protection in the current UK 
scheme, so it remains to be seen both how this is enacted, and the extent to which it is used. 
 
Though this registration initiative has laudable intentions, I suggest that its value is 
questionable, both in doctrine and implementation. In term of the technical content, the 
threshold of 25% is arbitrary and easily circumvented. When the European Union Third Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (3AMLD) was agreed in 2005, a 25% baseline was deemed to be 
sufficient, following the example in the FATF Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial 
                                                     
5 https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR.pdf  
6 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC, COM(2016) 450 final 2016/0208 (COD), 
5 July 2016. 
  6 
Ownership (which, however, was careful to note that its Recommendations do not specify 
the appropriate threshold) (FATF, 2014, p. 15). Article 43 of 3AMLD required the Commission 
to present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the “possible expediency 
and consequences of a reduction … from 25% to 20%” (European Commission, 2012). Though 
the Commission contemplated whether such modification was appropriate, it was not 
changed in AMLD4. It is likely that this will be lowered to 10% for certain entities which 
present a specific risk of being used for money laundering and tax evasion.7 This threshold, as 
indeed would be the case for any, can be circumvented by dividing the ownership into smaller 
elements by those who seek to hide ownership and control.  
 
The second doctrinal concern is that the PSC register and attendant obligations apply to UK 
companies and LLPs only, and not to foreign entities operating within UK. This excludes a large 
subset from the reach of the Register. Third, the scheme hinges to a large extent on self-
reporting, and maintenance and monitoring is likely to be onerous for Companies House. 
Unless resource for Companies House is increased, this scheme is not likely to be successful. 
 
In terms of implementation, registries provide a valuable starting point in identifying, 
monitoring and addressing criminal behaviour, but they need to be complemented and 
corroborated by other data sources. As observed in the World Bank study (van der Does de 
Willebois et al., 2011, p. 5), they “are almost invariably archival in nature; they rarely conduct 
independent verification; and in many cases, they are already stretched for resources”. They 
present a static outline of information that is likely to be partial and could possibly be false. 
Moreover, it is difficult, time consuming and expensive to verify the data within them. 
 
Fenwick and Vermeulen (2016, pp. 18-19) have questioned rightly the “ratcheting up” of 
disclosure requirements in this way, on the basis that forcing more information into the public 
domain is unlikely to be useful and merely encourages new and more imaginative means of 
circumvention. They propose, on grounds of effectiveness, reputation and profitability, the 
“nudging” of firms to “embrace open communication” (2016, p. 41). While this is persuasive 
in respect of otherwise legitimate entities that sometimes may be engaged for illicit means, 
if the primary purpose of establishing the company is to provide a front for illegal activity, this 
aim is not feasible. No amount of nudging will offset or deter those with criminal and corrupt 
intentions.  
 
The second significant legal change in UK company law, at least doctrinally, seeks to limit who 
or what can be a company director. At present, companies may appoint a corporate director 
as long as at least one of the directors is an individual (Companies Act 2006, s.155). Section 
87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 introduced a requirement for 
all company directors to be natural persons (unless the appointment falls within one of the 
exceptions that provided for by regulations made under s. 156B [Companies Act 2006, 
s.156A]) as part of the drive to ensure corporate transparency and facilitate more readily the 
identification of the true controllers/beneficial owners of the company. Though October 2016 
was mooted as the date of enactment, this has been deferred, and the provision is not yet in 
                                                     
7 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC, COM(2016) 450 final 2016/0208 (COD), 
5 July 2016. 
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force. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy held a consultation about 
this in early-2017; further action to taken has yet to be announced. So, what was heralded as 
a key measure to offset potential abuse has been postponed, and it is unclear when it will be 
introduced. Political rhetoric has not been matched by any action regarding the natural 
person requirement, thus rendering it no more than a paper exercise.  
 
Trusts 
 
The next structure to be considered is the trust, whose role and value in relation to money 
laundering and corruption has been emphasised in many studies (Blum et al., 1998, p. 95; 
European Commission 2000, p. 46; FATF, 2006, p. 61). Essentially, a trust is a common law 
construct that provides for the separation of legal ownership from beneficial ownership. It is 
a legitimate mechanism for transferring and managing assets, not least in relation to minors, 
incapacitated individuals, and charitable purposes. It comprises an agreement between two 
private parties, and “enjoy[s] a greater degree of privacy and autonomy than other corporate 
vehicles” (OECD, 2001, p. 25).  
 
In addition to legitimate personal and financial planning purposes, the perception is that the 
trust can be employed for illicit ends, due to their autonomous and relatively unregulated 
nature, and their ability and purpose to conceal the identity of the beneficiaries (OECD, 2001, 
p. 25). Notwithstanding that, the World Bank review of 150 grand corruption investigations 
found that trusts were used infrequently (van der Does de Willebois et al., 2011, p. 44), 
comprising five percent of the corporate vehicles identified and appearing in c.15 percent of 
the investigations, mostly in Latin America, the Caribbean, and high-income nations. These 
findings may challenge the presumption about misuse of trusts. It is unclear whether this 
pattern would be replicated in the UK, and in respect of “smaller” corruption schemes, that 
is, whether there is a connection between the scale of the corruption and the trust used.  
Nonetheless, one must be mindful that the cases explored in the World Bank review are 
unlikely to be representative, given that they comprise cases under investigation and that the 
“successful” misuse of trusts may never come to light. 
 
There is increased impetus from the EU to address the use of trusts for illegitimate purposes 
by means of transparency conditions, with strong support from NGOs like Global Witness 
(Global Witness, 2017). Article 31 of 4AMLD, as transposed into domestic UK law by 
Regulation 45 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds 
(Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, mandates the trustees of any express trust with 
tax consequences to hold adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial 
ownership of the trust. HM Treasury explains that an “express trust” is one “that was 
deliberately created by a settlor expressly transferring property to a trustee for a valid 
purpose, as opposed to a statutory, resulting or constructive trust” (HM Treasury, 2017, 9.2). 
The original EU proposal was a public register for all trusts, but this faced resistance from the 
UK government, purportedly based on the grounds of protection of privacy, and of course the 
desire to protect a significant element of its wealth management industry (Society of Trust 
and Estate Practitioners, 2014). The UK negotiated so that the register must contains trusts 
with a tax consequence only and is access is limited to appropriate authorities. In contrast to 
the companies’ beneficial owner register, the information is not publically available but can 
be accessed by law enforcement and the UK Financial Intelligence Unit. This register will be 
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administered by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which plans to launch it in summer 
2017 as an online service.8  
 
The same concerns about effectiveness of registers are of course salient here. The inherent 
nature of trusts is that they are private, autonomous, and difficult to monitor. Indeed, these 
characteristics provide major advantages over other structures in terms of profit 
maximisation and capital mobility, leading commentators to view them as embedding and 
maintaining wealth inequality (Harrington, 2017). Regardless, trusts will not be replaced or 
displaced, and thus the registers can only be partial in their effect. Those who wish to use 
trusts to hide assets and their origins will use ever more complex structures or front-persons 
to conceal the true beneficial owner.  
 
Partnerships 
 
The third corporate vehicle to be considered in respect of corruption in commercial enterprise 
is the partnership. Although partnerships are cited in OECD and FATF documentation as 
potentially problematic, in general it is perceived that they are not misused to the same 
extent as other corporate vehicles (OECD, 2001, p. 28). Like trusts, there may be a mismatch 
between their perceived vulnerability to corrupt use and the actual threat posed. There is 
particular concern about a form of partnership that is distinct to Scotland only, which appears 
to be employed with increasing regularity to conceal corrupt and illegal practices and assets. 
  
The Scottish Limited Partnership (SLP) is like a general partnership, in that it comprises two 
or more partners who carry on business with a view to profit. In a general partnership all 
partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership debts, whereas in a limited partnership 
there are two types of partner, and there must be at least one of each. The general partners 
are liable for debts and obligations of the limited partnership, and the limited partners have 
liability limited to extent of their capital contributions. The advantage of the SLP is that it has 
a separate legal personality, unlike limited partnerships constituted elsewhere in the UK. This 
means that the SLP itself can own assets, enter into contracts, sue or be sued, own property, 
borrow money and grant certain types of security. Thus, SLPs are used in investment fund 
structures, and in tax structuring. The SLP’s principal place of business must be in Scotland in 
order to become registered, but it is possible to migrate this to another jurisdiction following 
registration and for the SLP’s activities to be managed offshore. 
 
Though the SLP has a separate legal personality it has “tax transparency” in that it is taxed as 
though it did not have a separate legal personality, and no tax is payable by the SLP itself. 
Instead, partners are taxed on their share of partnership income and gains arrived at in 
accordance with their profit-sharing ratios. This “hybrid” status explains some of its appeal.  
 
This popularity is represented in the trebling of their numbers since 2011, while there was a 
rise of less than 50% for partnerships south of the border (Department of Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy, 2017, p. 8). More than 100 firms named so far in the notorious 
Laundromat scheme are SLPs (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 2017; BBC, 
                                                     
8 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-revenue-and-customs-trusts-and-estates-
newsletters/hmrc-trusts-and-estates-newsletter-april-2017  
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2015). As result, there are increasing calls for reform of SLPs (Department of Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy, 2017).  
 
While originally SLPs were not covered by the PSC register, the Scottish Partnerships (Register 
of People with Significant Control) Regulations 2017 modifies the regime to apply them. Now 
a general partnership constituted under the law of Scotland that is a “qualifying partnership”, 
namely one with solely corporate partners, must deliver PSC information to Companies 
House. While this will serve to improve transparency to a degree, it does not apply to all SLPs. 
Again, the economic attractiveness of such partnerships means that their abolition or 
substantial amendment is highly unlikely.  
 
 
CHAINS AND INTERMEDIARIES  
 
The outline provided above of the distinctive features of certain corporate vehicles and their 
ability to hide assets linked to corruption indicates that the vehicles per se are not the (only) 
problem, rather it is their use in certain ways by certain people. Furthermore, the extent to 
which the recent and forthcoming legal changes will impact on corrupt behaviour and assets 
is questionable. This is brought into sharp relief by the use of “chains” or “ladders” (Shaxson 
2011, 25) of corporate vehicles, spanning numerous different jurisdictions. This exploits the 
characteristics of anonymity of these structures, and confounds attempts to locate and 
confirm beneficial ownership. So, a rudimentary scheme might involve an international 
business company in Russia owned by another company in Ireland, which in turn is owned by 
a third entity in Scotland, controlled by a trust established in England. In reality, the schemes 
are much more complex: as the OECD (2001, p. 32) said, “The possible permutations are 
virtually limitless”. All of this serves to complicate and preclude successful investigations and 
actions such as asset recovery. Moreover, it underlines the weakness of some of the 
transparency provisions that have been introduced.    
 
Of course, a critical dimension in hiding beneficial ownership through complex chains of 
corporate vehicles lies in the reliance on professional intermediaries, such as company 
formation agents, lawyers, and trust and company service providers (TCSPs) (FATF, 2006). 
Though their service is not required to establish a company in the UK, legal, accounting and 
financial advice will be useful in respect of all corporate vehicles used to store and move illicit 
assets. This professional expertise is particularly desirable in respect of the construction of 
offshore entities. There will be a spectrum of knowledge, motivation and intention in respect 
of TCSPs whose services are connected with the organisation of corruption, ranging from fully 
lawful yet unethical behaviour; lack of awareness as to the aims of their clients; careless or 
negligence in failing to carry out due diligence, through to deliberate enabling and facilitation. 
 
In terms of legal responses, registered UK TCSPs need to be compliant with the Money 
Laundering Regulations 2017 regarding customer due diligence and suspicious activity 
reporting. When a TCSP is forming a company for a client, it must carry out due diligence, 
even if this is the only transaction being carried out for that customer (Regulation 4(2)). 
Moreover, HM Revenue and Customs recently issued TCSPs with notices under Paragraph 1, 
schedule 23 of the Finance Act 2011 to provide information regarding the ultimate beneficial 
ownership of offshore companies and beneficial interest in offshore partnerships and trusts 
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(HM Revenue & Customs, 2017). This is in an effort to ascertain who should be paying tax and 
to what level. However, measures like the PSC register will not capture all the entities handled 
by UK TCSPs, underlining how the legal landscape is patchy in its reach and application.  
 
Overall there is intensifying practitioner and academic consideration of professional 
facilitators of serious crime (Europol, 2013, p. 14; Home Office, 2013, p. 14). That said, and 
more specifically, the evidence base regarding TCSPs and the organisation of corruption in 
the UK is very limited. The World Bank review found inconsistency in terms of implementation 
by TCSPs of AML requirements, and differences between the form of structure: professional 
trustees tend to be more inquisitive about the source of funds to be vested in a trust than 
they would be if establishing a company (van der Does de Willebois et al., 2011, p. 47). 
Whether this holds for the UK and a broader range of corrupt practices remains to be seen.  
 
 
OBJECTIONS TO LEGAL CHANGES 
 
It appears that there is political unanimity as to the need to respond robustly to these ways 
of organising corruption in commercial enterprise. Regardless, one can contemplate some 
objections, both principled and pragmatic, to the current and proposed legal responses, 
centring on human rights, effectiveness, and unintended consequences.  
 
In the first instance, these measures have serious potential implications for civil liberties, 
whether we see that as limited to the “human rights of bad guys” (Ivory, 2014) or more 
broadly. Registers of personal data engage and potentially breach the right to privacy, as 
protected by Art 8 ECHR. The level of detail, the accessibility and the purpose for which the 
data is stored are all relevant here.  
 
In addition to a successful challenge in the French courts to a public trust register on the 
grounds of manifest disproportionality,9 concerns been raised by European Data Protection 
Supervisor (2017), and in scholarly commentary (Noseda, 2017) about the implications for 
privacy of these registers. The European Data Protection Supervisor expressed concern about 
breach of the data protection principle of purpose limitation, on the basis that proposed 
amendments from the EU will introduce policy purposes other than countering anti-money 
laundering and terrorism financing. Regardless, it is unlikely that any comparable legal 
challenge could be raised to the current corporate PSC register in the UK, on the basis that 
this is a proportionate response to a legitimate aim. Moreover, the trust register, by virtue of 
its limited accessibility, is also likely not to fall foul of challenge. 
 
It is debateable how effective and impactful these legal responses will be.  There is a lack of 
uniformity in legal doctrine in the UK. Beyond this, there are issues of statutory 
implementation, wherein the rhetoric around counter-corruption and transparency is not 
matched by application of the law. Moreover, the degree to which legal measures will be 
effective unless matched by sufficient resources is dubious. Beyond this, there is evident 
inconsistency between jurisdictions, leading to “criminogenic asymmetries” (Passas, 1999) 
                                                     
9 Décision n° 2016-591 QPC du 21 Octobre 2016. 
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which are likely to steer decisions about the placement and use of assets implicated in corrupt 
practices.    
 
On that point, significant questions remain about the degree to which the UK is serious about 
addressing the situation in its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.  As outlined, the 
UK is perceived to have a strong legal framework in respect of transparency, though its 
implementation and application is inconsistent. Beyond this, there is valid concern about UK 
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, such as the British Virgin Islands and the 
Cayman Islands, though there is little solid political action (Martini and Murphy, 2015). 
Notably, Jason Sharman has found that there is a mismatch between perception and 
empirical data, in that high-income OECD countries are more problematic than so-called 
offshore centres in that “Not only do the world’s major financial centers offer tighter secrecy, 
but corporate entities formed therein enjoy a status, standing, and legitimacy that are far less 
likely to arouse suspicion than those from stigmatized offshore locales” (Sharman, 2010, p. 
139). 
 
Furthermore, there are potential issues relating to the unintended and unpredictable 
consequences of such legal changes. As noted, legal and operational asymmetries between 
and within jurisdictions leads to crime displacement in terms of the location of assets and 
formation of structures. Moreover, it is conceivable that enhanced legislative and law 
enforcement responses will lead a “tactical displacement effect” (Rowe et al., 2013, p. 6), 
insofar as corrupt actors will rely on alternative means to reduce the risk of apprehension, 
perhaps through the increased use of intermediaries.  
 
 
MAKING SENSE OF THESE CHANGES  
 
What appears to be occurring in this context is the addressing of the ostensibly criminal 
problem of corruption through mostly non-criminal law means. Such a way of dealing with 
corruption and other forms of financial crime was once unorthodox but is now commonplace 
– rather than the traditional criminal law mechanism of investigation and prosecution, here 
we have a “follow the money” (King, 2013) or at least a “target the money” approach. It is 
significant that this is not necessarily a precursor to prosecution, but rather can be a way of 
disrupting corrupt practices, and of ascertaining the connections and nodes between criminal 
actors, and politically exposed persons.    
 
It is thought that tightening the rules around beneficial ownership can serve as a deterrent to 
potentially criminal actors as well as otherwise professional facilitators. Ultimately it makes 
monies less secure if they cannot be disguised and hidden effectively. Then, if identified, civil 
forfeiture and confiscation can permit the recouping of such assets, as contemplated by 
Article 31 UNCAC. Having said that, all of this is predicated upon the notion that there is 
money or property to recoup, which overlooks the “spend and go” habits of many criminals 
(Naylor, 2002); (Steinko, 2012). Thus, this approach is likely to impact on a certain set and 
level of corrupt actors only, which is likely to omit those insulated by virtue of status, or 
political position or connection.    
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The legal responses outlined in this chapter are both driven and implemented by a mix of 
state and non-state actors, relying on a combination of criminal and civil measures. This way 
of addressing problematic behaviour may be regarded as holistic and inventive, though runs 
the risk of being uneven in coverage and unprincipled in purpose. It is instructive to recall the 
observations of Julia Black (2001, p. 105) in relation to “command and control” regulation, as 
this sheds some light on the legal changes described above. In “command and control” 
regulation the State is “centred” and is envisaged as having the sole capacity to command 
and control, with a linear progression from policy formation through to implementation. The 
legal responses to the hiding of beneficial ownership in relation to corruption retain what 
Black reminds us is often denoted negatively by the term “command and control”: poorly 
targeted, rigid, ossified, under- or over-enforced rules, involving unintended consequences. 
That aside, in structure and purpose they seem to denote a move away from such regulation 
to a more diversified and participatory style. This (perhaps more charitable) understanding of 
the drive to reveal beneficial ownership is that a form of regulatory “decentring” (Black, 2001, 
p. 106) is taking place, exemplified by the situation regarding the proposed requirement that 
all company directors to be natural persons. After the UK Government realised that it had 
insufficient knowledge to be able to identify the form and cause of the problem and to design 
an appropriate solution, it reopened a consultation through the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy. A less optimistic interpretation might view this as an official 
volte-face after pushback from the business community.  
 
One could also view these legal responses as embodying both symbolic and practical 
dimensions. In the words of David Garland (2001, p. 105), the State more and more is faced 
with a “criminological predicament” and so is required to adapt to the “new reality” of crime 
control. Responsibilising companies and other third parties in the context of counter-
corruption and money laundering depicts this changing notion of governmentality, whereby 
the State is developing a form of rule which involves “the enlistment of others … and the 
creation of new forms of co-operative action” (Garland, 2001, p. 125). Simultaneous to this 
practical objective, the legislative activity exemplifies the notion that “something must be 
done” (Garland, 2001, p. 164), regardless of its effect. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
While a strong and proportionate regime to reveal beneficial ownership seems to be helpful 
in addressing corruption in commercial enterprise, it is less clear as to whether this will have 
any impact on the development and functioning of financial markets (Halliday, Levi and 
Reuter, 2014; Alldridge, 2008), as is often asserted (Vermeulen, 2013). Indeed, much more 
empirical work is needed to determine where our legal and operational priorities should lie, 
in that our focus on certain jurisdictions, actors and mechanism could well be misplaced and 
thus a distraction from the core problem. The law alone will not address the problem of the 
hiding of beneficial ownership in relation to corruption, not least given the unavoidable and 
apparently intractable tension between market freedom and effective regulation.    
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